A detailed look at how our “feels like” subjective experience is created

Consciousness remains one of the most perplexing puzzles in both philosophy and neuroscience. How is it that our brain’s mere processing of information is accompanied by a rich, subjective quality - the so-called “feels-like” aspect of experience? In this post, we explore the idea of weight-encoded qualia as presented in the FRESH (Functionalist & Representationalist ‘Emergent Self’ Hypothesis) model. We look at the key concepts, review rigorous research findings, and discuss how structured, weighted representations might be the very substrate of subjective experience.

Key Concepts in Consciousness

One of the seminal challenges in the study of consciousness is the Hard Problem - the question of why and how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience. Traditional theories have tried to bridge this gap with various approaches. For example, the Global Workspace Theory and Predictive Processing provide frameworks for understanding cognitive processing but often stop short of explaining the inherent “feel” of an experience.

At the heart of this discussion lies the notion of qualia - the intrinsic, qualitative aspects of experience. Early work by Nagel (1974) and later debates led by thinkers like Chalmers (1995) have highlighted that understanding consciousness requires not only describing cognitive functions but also accounting for why these functions are experienced subjectively.

Introducing the FRESH Model and Weight-Encoded Qualia

Traditional models often reject qualia - the subjective qualities of experience - or treat them as mysterious, ineffable, or merely correlated with neural activity.

In contrast, the FRESH model proposes a unified and mechanistic explanation of consciousness that is grounded in the architecture of representations within a system. According to FRESH:

  • A system must establish an inner-outer boundary to differentiate itself from its environment.
  • This boundary is the structural foundation for creating a self-model - a necessary component for any form of subjective experience.
  • Weight-encoded qualia refer to the idea that the “feels-like” quality of any experience arises directly from the way information is encoded, prioritised, and contextually integrated within a system.
  • Qualia are not additional properties of experience. They are the way information is structured, weighted, and processed within a system that ‘experiences’.
  • The illusion of a unified self-model with an immersive subjective experience provides significant survival advantages by ensuring coherence in perception, memory, and action.

In biological systems, for instance, neuromodulators such as dopamine, serotonin and adrenaline modulate neural gain - essentially adjusting the “brightness” or intensity with which sensory inputs are represented. When these signals are differentially weighted, certain inputs stand out more vividly - giving rise to the rich tapestry of subjective experience. Without this, experience would be a homogenous blur. In this sense, qualia are not an extra layer appended onto cognition; they are the intrinsic manifestation of structured, weighted representations.

Is there any evidence for this view?

The FRESH model draws support from several lines of research that investigate how modifications in representational structure can alter subjective experience. Here are some key examples.

Visual Perspective Shifts in Memory Recall - Self-Distancing Versus Immersion

Research has shown that recalling a memory from a first-person perspective can evoke stronger emotional responses than recalling it from a third-person perspective. Studies by Nigro and Neisser (1983) - and later extensions by Kross and Ayduk (2011) - indicate that the spatial framing of internal representations plays a crucial role in modulating emotional intensity.

Within the FRESH framework, this phenomenon is explained by the differential weighting of representations depending on the visual perspective used during recall. When you remember an event from a first-person perspective, your internal representation is more richly integrated with your self-model. This immersive encoding assigns a higher weight to the emotional and sensory details, making the memory feel more vivid and intense. Essentially, the “weight” here refers to the prominence or emphasis given to these aspects of the experience within the neural representation.

Conversely, when a memory is recalled from a third-person perspective - often referred to as self-distancing - the integration with the self-model is less direct. The brain assigns a lower weight to the associated emotional elements, which results in a dampened emotional response. In other words, by shifting the spatial framing relative to the self-model, the system recalibrates the internal weighting, leading to a measurable change in how the memory “feels”.

This dynamic process is central to the idea of weight-encoded qualia. It demonstrates that the qualitative aspect of experience - its subjective “feel” - is not static. Instead, it emerges from how different sensory, cognitive, and emotional inputs are integrated and prioritised within our self-representation. The fact that simply altering the perspective can change the emotional intensity of a memory provides compelling evidence for the FRESH model’s claim: the structure and weighting of internal representations directly shape our subjective experience.

This offers a clear, empirically supported link between representational weighting and the subjective quality of experience.

The evidence from visual perspective shifts in memory recall shows that:

  • Immersive (first-person) recall assigns higher weight to emotional details, resulting in a more vivid and intense experience.

  • Distanced (third-person) recall reduces the weighting of these details, leading to a calmer, less emotionally charged experience.

This process exemplifies how altering the spatial organisation of internal representations changes the “feels-like” aspect of our subjective experience - a core principle of weight-encoded qualia in the FRESH model.

Guided Imagery and Sensory Detail Manipulation

Guided imagery techniques are widely used in clinical settings to help individuals modify the emotional impact of their internal representations. Research by Holmes and Mathews (2005) has demonstrated that manipulating sensory details - such as brightness, colour, and spatial location - can significantly change the emotional quality of a mental image.

Under the FRESH model, this process is understood in terms of dynamic representational weighting. When you intentionally adjust sensory parameters, you are effectively changing the “weight” assigned to different aspects of the representation. For example:

  • Increasing Vividness:
    Enhancing the brightness or saturation of colours in a mental image increases the prominence of that image. This re-weighting makes the emotional response to the image stronger, as more neural resources are allocated to processing its details. The resulting qualia - the vivid “feel” of the image - become more intense.

  • Reducing Sensory Detail:
    Conversely, deliberately dulling or desaturating an image reduces its prominence. This lower weighting leads to a more muted emotional impact, demonstrating that the qualitative experience is directly linked to the sensory detail encoded within the representation.

  • Spatial Reorganisation:
    Altering the spatial arrangement of elements in a mental image - for example, by shifting its perceived location - can change how integrated the image is with the self-model. A reorganisation that distances the image from one’s core self-representation might lessen its emotional salience, while a configuration that brings it closer can intensify the emotional response (as discussed in detail above).

These manipulations provide a measurable means to explore the FRESH model’s claim that qualia emerge from the structured, weighted nature of representations. By systematically varying sensory details and observing the corresponding changes in emotional response, researchers can empirically assess how changes in representational weighting directly influence the “feels-like” quality of experience.

In practice, guided imagery serves as both a therapeutic tool and a research method. It allows individuals to train the integration of sensory inputs, potentially enhancing or modulating their emotional responses. This practical application of altering sensory parameters underscores the core idea of weight-encoded qualia - that the subjective quality of an experience is determined by the dynamic, context-dependent weighting of its underlying representations.

Gaze Direction and Cognitive Performance

Research indicates that individual differences in mental imagery vividness are closely linked to variations in cognitive performance. For instance, studies have demonstrated that the vividness of visual imagery can impact performance in tasks such as brain-computer interface interaction. This finding suggests that the quality and clarity of internal visual representations play a role in how effectively these tasks are executed.

Gaze direction provides an observable marker of this internal representational architecture. Research on navigational style has shown that the direction and pattern of gaze during exploration can reveal how individuals spatially organise and prioritise sensory information. In the context of the FRESH model, these gaze patterns are not incidental. They reflect the underlying weighting process - where specific sensory inputs are given more prominence within the overall internal representation.

When an individual directs their gaze in a consistent pattern, it suggests that certain aspects of their internal imagery are being emphasised. This increased weighting can lead to a richer, more detailed representation that enhances cognitive performance. For example, if a person’s gaze naturally aligns with the features of a mental image, they may be better at manipulating that image in tasks such as BCI interaction or navigation. Conversely, less optimised gaze patterns might indicate a weaker weighting of visual information, leading to reduced performance.

The relationship between gaze direction and cognitive performance supports the FRESH model’s claim that the “feels-like” quality of experience arises from the dynamic, context-dependent weighting of internal representations. By mapping individual gaze patterns to cognitive tasks, researchers can obtain measurable evidence of how base-level representational architecture influences not only subjective experience but also task performance. For example:

  • Individual Differences: Variability in the vividness of mental imagery is reflected in distinct gaze patterns.

  • Task Performance: More optimised gaze direction, indicating stronger weighting of visual inputs, is linked to improved performance in tasks like BCI interaction and navigation.

  • Weight-Encoded Qualia: These findings support the idea that the qualitative experience - the “feels-like” aspect - emerges from the structured weighting and integration of sensory representations.

The Rubber Hand Illusion and Body Ownership

The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) is a striking demonstration of how our brains integrate multisensory inputs to create the experience of body ownership. In the context of weight-encoded qualia, the key idea is that the subjective “feels-like” quality of having a hand is not simply a static property - it is continuously shaped by how different sensory inputs are weighted and integrated.

In the RHI, when visual and tactile inputs are synchronised - that is, when you see a rubber hand being stroked at the same time you feel your own (hidden) hand being stroked - your brain begins to update its internal representation of your body. Here’s how the weighting comes into play:

  • Sensory Reliability and Weighting:
    The brain assesses the reliability of incoming sensory signals. In the RHI, the synchronised visual and tactile signals are often deemed more reliable than the conflicting proprioceptive input (which indicates the actual position of your real hand). As a result, the brain assigns a higher weight to the visual-tactile signals. This shift in weighting causes the representation of the hand to migrate - the rubber hand starts to feel like it is part of your body.

  • Dynamic Integration of Representations:
    Weight-encoded qualia suggest that the qualitative “feel” of an experience arises from this dynamic integration process. When the brain gives extra weight to the visual and tactile cues, the emergent experience (or qualia) is that of ownership - you ‘feel’ as though the rubber hand is your own. In this sense, the vividness and the strength of the body-ownership experience are directly tied to how much emphasis (or weight) is given to particular sensory inputs.

  • Neurocognitive Underpinnings:
    Tsakiris’s work on body-ownership highlights that multisensory integration is crucial for constructing a stable self-representation. The differential weighting - where synchronised cues override mismatched ones - is what enables the brain to create a coherent “self” model. This selective weighting is exactly what the FRESH model refers to when it talks about weight-encoded qualia: the subjective quality of having a hand emerges from the way these inputs are prioritised and integrated.

The RHI illustrates that if certain sensory modalities are given more weight during integration, the resulting subjective experience changes accordingly. It is this adjustment in weighting - the differential emphasis on synchronised visual and tactile signals versus conflicting proprioceptive signals - that produces the unique “feels-like” quality of body ownership. This mechanism is a concrete example of how weight-encoded qualia operate, reinforcing the core claim of the FRESH model that the qualitative aspects of experience arise from structured, dynamic representational weighting.

TMS Interventions and Emotional Modulation

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has emerged as a powerful tool for modulating emotional responses by directly targeting specific brain regions. Research has demonstrated that TMS can induce measurable changes in mood by altering the neural circuits involved in the integration and weighting of sensory and cognitive information. Under the FRESH model, this provides strong external validation for the idea that subjective experience - the “feels-like” quality - is fundamentally linked to the structured representation of information in the brain.

When TMS is applied to regions such as the prefrontal cortex, it influences neural gain modulation. This process effectively re-weights incoming signals by either enhancing or attenuating the prominence of particular representations. For example, by boosting activity in circuits that integrate positive emotional signals, TMS can lead to improvements in mood. Conversely, disrupting circuits responsible for negative affect may diminish depressive symptoms. In both cases, the qualitative experience of mood is directly tied to how the brain assigns weight to various inputs.

This dynamic modulation of representational weighting is central to the FRESH model. It illustrates that the subjective quality of an experience is not fixed but can be externally influenced by altering the balance of neural activity. TMS provides a tangible means of adjusting this balance, thereby offering a measurable link between neural circuitry and the qualitative, weight-encoded nature of experience. For exampe:

  • Neural Circuit Modulation: TMS alters the integration of sensory and emotional inputs by adjusting neural gain.

  • Mood Improvement: Changes in representational weighting can result in measurable improvements in mood, as evidenced by TMS studies.

  • External Validation: TMS interventions support the FRESH model’s premise that the “feels-like” quality of experience emerges from the dynamic weighting of internal representations.

Neurotransmitters and their Neuromodulatory Effects

MDMA is well known for inducing a euphoric, “feel-good” state by dramatically altering serotonin signalling. The drug acts as a potent releasing agent - it forces serotonin out of neurons while simultaneously inhibiting its reuptake. This results in a massive surge of serotonin in the synapse, which in turn intensifies stimulation of receptors involved in mood regulation. Under the FRESH model, this surge is understood as a re-calibration of the internal weighting mechanism.

When serotonin is released in such abundance, neural circuits that integrate emotional and sensory inputs become highly activated. In effect, the internal representations of these inputs are given a greater “weight” - they become more salient and vivid. This re-weighting produces a richer qualitative experience, meaning that the subjective “feel” of emotions is amplified. Essentially, MDMA’s effects can be seen as an external intervention that increases the prominence of emotional representations, thereby enhancing the overall “feels-like” quality of the experience.

Moreover, as the drug’s effects wear off, the brain often experiences a drop in available serotonin. This reduction leads to a decreased weighting of these neural circuits, which may explain the subsequent “blue” period or lowered mood. The transition from heightened to diminished representational weighting offers a mechanistic explanation for the fluctuating mood states observed with MDMA use.

In parallel, studies on dopaminergic salience attribution have shown that dopamine neuron firing adjusts the perceived importance of stimuli by shifting from a tonic to a phasic mode in response to salient events. This adaptive gain control is analogous to the serotonin-induced re-weighting seen with MDMA, further underscoring the principle that neuromodulators play a critical role in shaping the qualitative aspects of experience.

Overall, MDMA’s impact on serotonin exemplifies how changes in neurochemical dynamics can directly reconfigure the internal weighting of representations. This process is central to the FRESH model’s assertion that the quality of conscious experience - or weight-encoded qualia - arises from the structured and dynamic weighting of neural signals.

Summary and Implications

The FRESH model presents a compelling, testable framework for understanding consciousness by grounding the “feels-like” quality of subjective experience in the structured, dynamic weighting of neural representations. Rather than being an extra, mysterious layer atop cognition, the qualitative aspects of experience emerge intrinsically from how sensory, cognitive, and emotional inputs are prioritised and integrated.

Key insights include:

  • Foundational Spatial Integration:
    The establishment of an inner–outer boundary is critical for developing a self-model. This basic spatial differentiation lays the groundwork for all subsequent representational weighting, allowing the brain to distinguish between self and non-self and to build the structured representations necessary for subjective experience.

  • Weight-Encoded Qualia:
    The model asserts that the vivid “feel” of an experience is a direct consequence of how information is encoded, weighted, and processed. Neuromodulators such as serotonin, dopamine, and adrenaline modulate neural gain – effectively adjusting the prominence of certain sensory and emotional signals. These shifts in weighting determine how intense or muted an experience feels, as evidenced by phenomena like the euphoria of MDMA or the altered emotional impact of memory recall from different visual perspectives. These provide clear survival benefits by driving a subject to respond more effectively to the salient sensory input.

  • Empirical Support Across Diverse Modalities:
    Research across multiple domains bolsters the FRESH model.
    • Visual Perspective Shifts: Studies show that first-person (immersive) recall assigns greater weight to emotional details, leading to more intense experiences, whereas third-person (distanced) recall dampens these effects.
    • Guided Imagery: Clinical work demonstrates that manipulating sensory details (brightness, colour, spatial configuration) alters the emotional impact of mental images by re-weighting their representations.
    • Gaze Direction: Observations linking gaze patterns to cognitive performance indicate that the base-level representational architecture – including spatial orientation – influences how visual inputs are weighted and integrated.
    • TMS Interventions and MDMA Effects: External manipulations, whether by TMS or neurochemical agents like MDMA, show that altering neural circuit dynamics leads to measurable changes in mood and subjective experience, thereby validating the idea that the “feels-like” quality of experience arises from dynamic representational weighting.
  • Broader Theoretical and Practical Implications:
    By bridging the gap between physical processes and subjective experience, the FRESH model challenges traditional dualistic approaches to consciousness. Its emphasis on measurable, dynamic weighting processes offers new avenues for research in mental health, potentially informing novel therapeutic interventions. Furthermore, understanding how qualitative experience emerges from representational weighting could guide the development of artificial intelligence systems with emergent self-models, expanding our conception of cognition beyond biological systems.

In essence, the FRESH model reframes the hard problem of consciousness as a question of how information is integrated and weighted – a process that is both measurable and experimentally tractable. This paradigm shift not only deepens our understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings of subjective experience but also opens exciting possibilities for interdisciplinary research in neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence.


References

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